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PAST THE PILLARS OF HERCULES: FRANCIS BACON AND
THE SCIENCE OF RULEMAKING*
Daniel R. Coquillette**
Title page of Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620)
* “[S]ailing past the Pillars of Hercules and ignoring the ancient warnings ‘non
ultra!’” DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACON 258 (William Twining & Neil MacCormick
eds., 1992). The above frontispiece of Francis Bacon’s NOVUM ORGANUM (1620) (from
GIBSON, infra note 1, at 87) shows the Pillars of Hercules and a small, brave ship passing
beyond them. See also FRANCIS BACON, SYLVA SYLVARUM, frontispiece (1626); R. W. GIBSON,
FRANCIS BACON: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HIS WORKS AND OF BACONIANA TO THE YEAR 1750 87, 147,
157 (1950). This Article obviously reflects the private views of the author, not of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure or the Judicial Conference of the United
States. Special thanks are due to Charles Riordan, the invaluable editorial assistant to the
Monan Chair.
** Reporter, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of
the United States, 1985 to present; J. Donald Monan, S. J. University Professor, Boston
College; Charles Warren Visiting Professor of American Legal History, Harvard Law School.
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INTRODUCTION: EDWARD H. COOPER AND THE DEBAUCHED BUT
INTELLECTUAL COURT OF JAMES I
In honoring a distinguished person such as Edward H. Cooper, it
is customary to make comparisons with famous figures of the past
(e.g., “How Bill Clinton reminds me of George Washington”). Fran-
cis Bacon (1561–1626), disinherited at birth, rose in the debauched
court of James I to be Vice Regent and Lord Chancellor, the second
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most powerful man in England.1 Despite cruelly betraying his best
supporter, the Earl of Essex in 1601 (who was executed), and hav-
ing a number of scandals involving stable boys and debt, Bacon
flourished. He became a major advocate for Stuart divine-right au-
thoritarianism, thus earning the hatred of Chief Justice Coke and
the common-law bar. Impeached by Parliament in 1621 for bribery,
Bacon confessed to receiving huge bribes as Lord Chancellor, but
argued that he decided the cases fairly, despite, in his words, being
guilty of “corruption.”2 Stripped of his offices, he retired in disgrace
to his country estate, where he wrote his great De Augmentis Scien-
tiarum (1623), his prophetic New Atlantis (1624), and, some think,
all of Shakespeare and even Don Quixote.3
The parallels between Bacon’s career and that of Edward H.
Cooper are, of course, obvious. Bacon was one of the great legal
minds of his day. Unlike the common-law judges who formed the
law by deciding cases, Bacon expressed his greatness in writing bril-
liant juristic treatises and, as Lord Chancellor, drafting one of the
first modern rule systems, the Ordinances in Chancery (1617–1620).4
Indeed, my thesis is that Bacon invented modern, scientific
rulemaking by fusing his new theories of inductive, empirical re-
search with the traditions of equitable pleading and is, in fact, the
intellectual forbearer of the likes of Charles Clark, Benjamin
Kaplan, and Edward Cooper.
My intention is to establish this thesis by examining Bacon’s Ordi-
nances and his seminal A Proposition to His Majesty Touching the
1. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACON 4–126 (William Twining & Neil Mac-
Cormick eds., 1992). For particularly readable biographies of Francis Bacon, see CATHARINE
DRINKER BOWEN, FRANCIS BACON: THE TEMPER OF A MAN (1963) (Bacon’s early years are de-
tailed at 23–42); DAPHNE DU MAURIER, THE WINDING STAIR: FRANCIS BACON, HIS RISE AND FALL
(1976). For the moral tone of the Court of James I, see DAPHNE DU MAURIER, GOLDEN LADS: A
STUDY OF ANTHONY BACON, FRANCIS AND THEIR FRIENDS (1975). A good recent account is LISA
JARDINE & ALAN STEWART, HOSTAGE TO FORTUNE: THE TROUBLED LIFE OF FRANCIS BACON
(1999).
2. For the original documentation of the charges and Bacon’s confessions, see XIV
THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 209–78 (James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis & Douglas
Denton Heath eds., 1874) [hereinafter Spedding (all volumes)]. This great edition of Ba-
con’s works remains the most widely cited by scholars, although a new project by Oxford
University Press, THE OXFORD FRANCIS BACON, is underway. See FRANCIS BACON, THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF LEARNING i, vii–viii (Michael Kiernan ed., 2000). On the bribery, see COQUILLETTE,
supra note 1, at 222 & 263–64 nn.13 & 14; JARDINE & STEWART, supra note 1, at 448–69. R
3. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 223–62. As to Bacon, Shakespeare, and Cervantes, R
see NIEVES MATHEWS, FRANCIS BACON: THE HISTORY OF A CHARACTER ASSASSINATION 384–93
(1996); N.B. COCKBURN, THE BACON-SHAKESPEARE QUESTION: THE BACONIAN THEORY MADE
SANE (1998). Sir Edwin Dunning Lawrence believed that “every significant piece of Elizabe-
than or Jacobean literature emanated from Bacon’s pen.” K. E. Attar, Sir Edwin Dunning-
Lawrence: A Baconian and His Books, 5 LIBRARIAN 294, 311 (2004).
4. Spedding vol. VII, supra note 2, at 347–72. R
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Compiling and Amendment of the Laws of England (1616).5 These show
Bacon’s great debt to Roman jurisprudence and Renaissance criti-
cal thinking but also show the unique contribution Bacon has made
to modern progressive jurisprudence. This is particularly true as to
the forming of law by prospective rules, rather than retroactive case
law, and the testing and amendment of such rules in light of Ba-
con’s revolutionary theories of inductive scientific reasoning and
empirical observation.
Bacon’s innovations earned him contempt and ferocious critical
opposition, both during his life and up to the present day. I will
conclude by noting three particular sources of this opposition that
remain relevant to scientific, progressive rulemaking. As Mark
Twain was thought to have said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it
rhymes.”6
I. THE HISTORICAL SOURCE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The significance of Bacon’s revolutionary approach to law mak-
ing can only be appreciated in its historical context. This context
has three fundamental aspects. First, there is the great ideological
contribution of Roman law to Western jurisprudence and its ongo-
ing importance as a continuing foil to a second great tradition: the
literally insular, but extraordinarily important, evolution of an in-
cremental English “common law.” In turn, that evolution of English
common law is nowhere more powerfully illustrated than by the de-
velopment of common-law pleading and the causes of action.
Finally, the emergence of equity jurisprudence, born of the relig-
ious tradition of the Church and a new Renaissance humanism—
both indebted to Roman legal science—set the stage for Bacon’s
bold innovations.
5. Spedding vol. XIII, supra note 2, at 61–71. R
6. Eugene Volokh, History Doesn’t Repeat Itself, But It Rhymes, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Feb. 18, 2005, 1:51 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1108756279.shtml. It seems that al-
though this quote has been attributed to Mark Twain, no one has been able to find the
original published source (as far as I can tell). The UCLA Law School research library was
once asked to track down the source, and could not definitively attribute the quote to Twain.
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A. The Great “Rivers” of Western Legal Ideology
Roman legal science underlies all of modern rulemaking. In-
deed, the words “rule,”7 “civil,”8 and “legislation”9 are all of Roman
origin. Preserved by the great legal projects of the Emperor Justin-
ian and rediscovered in the twelfth century at the dawn of Europe’s
great universities, such as Bologna, Paris, and Oxford, it still pro-
vides the cornerstone of Continental jurisprudence.10 The Church,
traditionally centered in Rome and the guardian in the darkest days
of Latin literacy, early applied Roman law concepts to contempo-
rary administrative problems, and its lead was gradually followed
throughout Europe.11
What made England unique was not that it was free of Roman
law influence—the Roman tradition was strong in its universities
and in its canon law—but rather that its insular character gave rise
to a counter force. The second “river” of legal culture was invented
by conquerors to address specific problems they faced in adminis-
tering, to them, a foreign and often hostile population.12 Short of
trained judges and always concerned about challenges to the legiti-
macy of their rule, the Normans and Norman Angevin descendants
hit on the idea of leaving the traditional Anglo-Saxon local courts—
the folc-moots—intact, and establishing a consistent, national system
of law that was restricted to just those matters of particular concern
to the central government: namely, serious crimes (i.e., “felonies”
not “misdemeanors”), land disputes involving “free tenure” (i.e.,
not the local copyhold of the serfs on the manors, or “unfree ten-
ure”), and certain important civil actions, all of which could have
financial consequences to the government.13 This national legal sys-
tem, “common” to all of the counties and shires, soon was termed
the “common law.”
7. From “regulare.” “Regula” refers to a straight stick. See THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTION-
ARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1055 (R.E. Allen ed., 8th ed. 1990).
8. From “civilis.” “Civis” refers to a citizen. Id. at 206.
9. From “lex legis,” the Roman term for specific, enacted, and usually written law. Id. at
76–77; see also CASSELL’S LATIN DICTIONARY 316 (J. R. V. Marchant & Joseph F. Charles eds.,
rev. ed. 1953); THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 1.2–.3 (F. de Zulueta ed. & trans., 1946).
10. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 1–10 (2d ed.
2004); see generally FRANCIS DE ZULUETA & PETER STEIN, THE TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW IN
ENGLAND AROUND 1200 (1990) (describing early Roman law teaching in the English
universities).
11. See generally W. W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW
(2d ed. 1974); R. H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1987) (describing
the impact of Roman law on the evolution of canon law).
12. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 55–63. R
13. Id. at 58–59. See also J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 14–62
(3d ed. 1990); R. C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW (1973).
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In developing this system, the Norman Angevins had three great
ideas. The first was leveraging scarce judicial resources by judges
“riding circuit.” The original central courts—the King’s Bench, the
Common Pleas, and the Excheques—had specific jurisdiction and
eventually met regularly at Westminster Hall in London, built by
the Norman William Rufus in 1099 and still standing.14 But between
regular sessions in London, the small band of trained judges would
“ride circuit” as “justices in eyre” and hold “assize courts” in the
county towns, bringing common-law justice out to the people and
thus stretching judicial manpower.15
To this “assize” idea, the Norman Angevins added a second: jury
trial. What better way to save judicial labor and to ensure popular
support for judicial order than to “coopt” the local population in
the process itself! The Norman Angevins had developed juries in
Normandy as a tool of administration, putting local citizens under
oath (hence “juror,” from the Latin jurare, to swear) to answer ques-
tions about taxable assets and other issues.16 The “grand jury” (i.e.,
“big,” usually twenty-one) continued this notion of presentment, re-
porting on crimes in the county to the visiting judge, while the
“petit jury” (usually twelve) early replaced ordeal as a mode of
proof for crime. Indeed, we still use these Norman French terms for
juries, as well as other “law” French terms such as “attorney,” “voir
dire,” “felony,” “misdemeanor,” and “oyez” in modern jury trials.17
Finally, in attempting to limit access to the centralized, common-
law courts, the Norman Angevins developed a formulary system of
causes of action, which remain the ancestor of modern common-
law pleading. This was not done by a statute or central decree, but
by the evolving practice of the courts over many years.18 In the end,
this “river” of incremental, evolutionary, court-made procedural
law, so different in both jurisprudence and philosophy from the
Roman Codex, would flow with the British Empire to lands as far
from that Atlantic island as India, Australia, Nigeria, Kenya, New
Zealand, Hong Kong, Barbados, Canada, and yes, the United States,
14. See DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1297 (1980).
15. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE COMMON LAW 25–36 (2d ed.
1981); COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 154–55. R
16. COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 160–62. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 84–90; OXFORD R
DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 642 (defining juror); see also JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY R
JUDGES 118–29 (1960).
17. See EARL JOWITT, THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 176, 793, 1178, 1285, 1843 (Clif-
ford Walsh ed., 1959) (providing French roots for “attorney,” “felony,” “voir dire,” and
“oyez”).
18. See generally F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.
H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1910) (explaining the evolution of writs and providing
examples of them); BAKER, supra note 13, at 63–83, 612–27 (same). R
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creating an historical and ideological rival to that other great cul-
tural river, the law of Rome.19
B. The Evolution of Common-Law Pleading
Common-law pleading linked process, substantive rights, and
mode of proof in one system of forms, the so-called “writ” system.20
The common-law courts were a restricted-entry system, and the
ticket was a judicial writ. These were purchased in blank from that
center of literacy in the Kingdom, the office of the Lord Chancellor
or Chancery, in London. The Chancery kept a set of appropriate
forms, later reproduced as the “Register of Writs.” The appropriate
names of the parties could then be inserted, much like complaints
and subpoena forms used today. But—and here was the key
point—only the writ that correctly described the cause of action
presented by the facts of the plaintiff’s case would do, and the pa-
rameters of the causes of action described by the writs were origi-
nally very narrow.21 Many wrongs suffered by potential plaintiffs
were not described by writs in the Register and thus lay outside the
acceptable common-law causes of action. Remedies for these
wrongs were only available in the Church courts, the feudal courts,
the traditional local courts, or not at all.
Access to that other great Norman invention, jury trial, was one
of the great attractions of this “common law” pleading system, as
was the fact that common law courts were “courts of record,” and
kept good central accounts. But not all causes of action were enti-
tled to jury trial. In fact, all of the earlier causes of action, described
in a family of writs forms known by their first word as “Praecipe”
writs, were triable instead by “primitive” modes of proof, namely
oath helping (known by its Latin name as “compurgation”) and
trial by battle.22 These modes gained their legitimacy by involving
God directly in the process, not unlike ordeals in criminal cases.
Oath helping involved a contest of original oaths as sacred objects,
backed by supporting oaths, all of which would have to be perfect
in form. Of course, God would cause an oath helper giving a false
sacred oath to slip up. This mode of “primitive” proof was required
19. In the immortal words of Maitland, it was this formulary system that formed “the
strongest bulwark against Romanism.” See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 585 (2d ed., 1898).
20. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 149–52; 87 SELDEN SOCIETY, EARLY REGISTERS OF R
WRITS xi–xii (E. de Hass & G. D. G. Hall eds., 1970).
21. COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 152–53. R
22. Id. at 152–53, 158–59.
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in the causes of action contained in the Writs of Right (property
ownership), Covenant (documents under seal), Trover, Detinue,
and other Praecipe writs. The idea was the same for the Writ of Right
Tenant in Capite, the cause of action for land title disputes at the
top of the feudal system, but these were tried by “battle” (i.e., hired
champions that whacked at each other with padded weapons until
God caused the one representing the party at fault to give up).23
Why were these early causes of action linked to a mode of proof
other than jury trial? Probably because jury trial as a source of civil,
rather than criminal, judgment was still evolving. But by the reign
of Henry II, a new set of remedies, the Questus Est Nobis writs, were
introduced. Often referred to as the “Possessory Writs,” they were
designed to restore those in occupations of land to possession if
“disseised,” or dispossessed by force—clearly an effort to reduce
“self help” in anticipation of seeking a judicial remedy.24 But unlike
the Praecipe writs, the Questus Est Nobis writs were to be tried by jury.
One prevalent feature of both the ancient Praecipe writs, with
their “irrational” modes of proof, and the Questus Est Nobis writs is
that the issue decided had to be reduced to a “yes” or “no” answer.
God either causes a slip in the oath helping or not, and the “Posses-
sory Writs” continued in that tradition. Either a person had been
thrown off land during a brief period (i.e., “since the King returned
from France”) or not. This required that each trial involve just one
issue that was properly framed as a cause of action set forth in the
correct writ. All of common law pleading began by narrowing legal
disputes to this one issue that could then be resolved by a simple
decision of “yes” or “no.” Inherent in this process was a very narrow
set of remedies. All the Questus Est Nobis writs simply restored the
prevailing party to possession (i.e., no damages, simply restitu-
tion).25 This was also true of most of the Praecipe writs, including
Trover, Debt Detinue, and Writ of Right. The remedy was simply to
return the unjust enrichment. In Covenant, an exception, the only
remedy was specific performance of the covenant. Once the narrow
terms of the covenant writ were met (i.e., a document under seal
signed by the party to be charged) the only defense permitted was
“non est factum,” meaning “not my deed—not my signature.” The
only issue to be decided, by wager of law, was therefore “yes” or
“no”—it was the defendant’s deed or it was not.26
23. See id. at 159; WALKER, supra note 14, at 119. For a classic, see G. NEILSON, TRIAL BY R
COMBAT (1890) (providing an account of judicial dueling).
24. COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 153–55. R
25. See id. at 154–55.
26. Id. 152–55, 169–70; see also BAKER, supra note 13, at 440–44. R
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In the last stage of the evolution of common-law pleading, the
introduction of “Ostensurus Quare” or Trespass Writs, the system
evolved beyond “yes” or “no” answers, and allowed the jury to give
damages. Trespass was a cause of action that was triable in the
King’s Bench, rather than the Common Pleas, because it was more
like a crime than the usual civil actions.27 The original require-
ments were an act done vis et armis (“with force of arms”) contra
pacem nostrum (“against the King’s peace”). The original trespass
action contemplated a physical assault, and it was obviously impossi-
ble to put the victims back in as good shape by restitution, particu-
larly given pain and suffering and physical injury. You hit someone
with a baseball bat, and you cannot “restore” the victim’s prior con-
dition. In trespass actions, juries could do more than answer “yes”
and “no”; they could give damages.
There is not enough space here to describe the eventual expan-
sion of trespass actions, largely by legal fiction, to eventually cover
everything from Ejectment to Action on the Case in Assumpsit (a
contract remedy which could be so far removed from a violent at-
tack as to involve simple nonfeasance).28 The reason was clearly the
desire by plaintiffs to avoid irrational modes of proof and to gain
damages, not just restitution. The old rule for using the older writs,
when appropriate, was finally revoked in Slade’s Case in 1602, which
also permitted trespass action in both the King’s Bench and the
Common Pleas, conferring the benefits of more business on both.29
From then on, the Ostensurus Quare writs reigned supreme, with
jury-trial modes of proof and damage remedies as their primary fea-
ture. Trespass became the “mother writ” of modern common-law
causes of action.
But the gradual evolution of the causes of action and their ac-
companying writs gave a “mindset” to common-law pleading that
proved durable. First, the law was almost entirely judge made
through incremental case law. Even radical reforms, such as that of
Slade’s Case, were done through legitimizing legal fictions—in that
case, the Indebitatus fiction.30 Secondly, a cause of action was never
27. COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 155–57, 171–72; see also VAN CAENEGEM, supra note R
13, at 29–54. R
28. See, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 3–196
(1975) (explaining the conceptual history of the action of assumpsit). Also see the lucid, if
outdated, account in T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 353–78
(5th ed. 1956).
29. See Slade’s Case, 4 Coke’s Reports 92(b) (1602), in COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at R
261–63.
30. See id. at 250–52. On the Indebitatus fiction, see WALKER, supra note 14, at 607. In R
Maitland’s words, these “forms of action” were “living things” that grew in the context of
regular, adjudicated cases:
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just procedural. Each cause of action stood for a substantive right, a
carefully defined remedy, and a particular mode of proof. A divi-
sion between “procedure” and “substantive law” would be
incomprehensible to our common-law ancestors.31 Finally, the com-
mon-law system was restrictive. It was carefully designed to remedy
only certain wrongs—wrongs of particular interest to the Norman
Angevin Crown. The older causes of action also required narrowing
all issues to a “yes” or “no” answer. Even after the evolution of the
Questus Est Nobis trespass writs gave juries the power to award dam-
ages in a wider range of cases, it was in the best interest of the com-
mon-law judiciary, particularly in circuits far from London, to keep
matters as simple as possible for the trier of fact. This avoided the
appearance that cases were resolved by judicial discretion, as op-
posed to the routine, predictable, and narrow application of the
formulary writs.32 Growing from the insecurity of an occupying Nor-
man elite, both jury trial and formulary pleading removed responsi-
bility from the professional judge and devolved it into the hands of
the lay people of the region, as juries, and also into a system of
fixed forms, each with its own requirements, mode of proof, and
remedies, that—in theory at least—made life as easy as possible for
the jury, as predictable as possible for the parties, and as legitimate
as possible in the eyes of a suspicious public.
C. The Extraordinary Contribution of Equitable Pleading
and the Subrin Thesis
Common-law courts were never intended to be the exclusive
source of all legal remedies. They were only to be the exclusive
source of legal remedies for those causes of action of interest to the
Crown and that also met the narrow requirements of the writs and
Our forms of action are not mere rubrics nor dead categories; they are not the out-
come of a classificatory process that has been applied to pre-existing materials. They
are institutes of the law; they are—we say it without scruple—living things. Each of
them lives its own life, has its own adventures, enjoys a longer or shorter day of vigour,
usefulness and popularity, and then sinks perhaps into a decrepit and friendless old
age. A few are still-born, some are sterile, others live to see their children and chil-
dren’s children in high places. The struggle for life is keen among them and only the
fittest survive.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 588. R
31. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914–18 (1987).
32. In Subrin’s words, “[i]n the Middle Ages discretion is entirely excluded; all is to be
fixed by iron rules.” Id. at 918. This is largely, although not entirely, true. For a discussion of
common law action without writs, “plaints,” and “Querelos,” see COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, R
at 158, 175–76.
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common-law pleading. “Supplemental” local courts, descended
from the Anglo-Saxon folc-moots, continued for centuries. So did
feudal courts and Church courts, with their formidable ecclesiasti-
cal remedy of excommunication, retain control of much of what
today is regarded as the business of a probate court.33 But the grow-
ing power of a centralized royal Executive, particularly during the
Renaissance and the reigns of the mighty Tudor monarchs, saw the
development of a new style of supplemental jurisdiction, the Con-
ciliar Courts, of which the oldest, and the most powerful, was the
Court of the Lord Chancellor, or the Chancery.34
The medieval King was always regarded as the source of “com-
plete justice,” and his spiritual advisor, the Lord Chancellor, was his
natural designee to meet this responsibility. This function was
completely separate from the Lord Chancellor’s role as head of a
secretariat, and thus from the supply of common-law writs.35 Access
to the Chancellor’s court was limited in one very important way: no
case with a legal remedy (i.e., a remedy in the common-law courts
as a cause of action) could be entertained.36 In theory, therefore,
there could be no competition between the Chancery and the com-
mon law. The Chancery could only fill the common law’s gaps.
During the sixteenth century, under strong Tudor monarchs,
other “conciliar” courts grew in influence. Like the Chancery, these
were based on a powerful member of the King’s Privy Council, such
as the Lord High Admiral (The High Court of Admiralty), the Lord
President of the Privy Seal (The Court of Requests), the Lord High
Constable of Earl Marshal (The Court of the Constable and
Marshal), and the entire Privy Council sitting as an extraordinary
criminal court (The Star Chamber).37 Each of these courts supple-
mented the common-law courts in a particular way. For example,
the Admiralty heard cases arising in foreign trade and on the high
seas, the Requests heard cases between poor people, the Constable
and Marshal heard military cases, and the Star Chamber heard
cases that threatened national security and were not triable in the
ordinary courts—a concept relevant to today’s terrorist problems.
In theory, none competed directly with the common-law courts as,
33. See id. at 183–84; see also BAKER, supra note 13, at 26–33; Charles Donahue, Jr., Roman R
Canon Law in the Medieval English Church: Stubbs vs. Maitland Re-Examined After 75 Years in the
Light of Some Records from the Church Courts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 647, 658–59 (1974).
34. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 185–88. R
35. Id. at 151–52, 185; BAKER, supra note 13, at 64–66, 114–20. R
36. Id. at 185. See generally BAKER, supra note 13, at 112–34 (describing the Courts of R
Chancery and Equity).
37. COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 205–09. R
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by definition, absence of a common-law remedy was a sine qua non
of their jurisdiction.
For our purposes, the most important thing about these courts is
that they used a different procedure from common-law pleading.
First, none had jury trials, and thus were free of the need to state
issues clearly and simply for lay triers of fact. Second, rather than
looking to common-law causes of action and writs to initiate pro-
ceedings, the courts used far simpler “bills” that recited the facts
and the remedies sought.38 Finally, trial process was very different,
based far more on production of documents and affidavits and far
less on in-court testimony—something one would expect where the
triers of fact were experienced specialist judges rather than juries.
This process, used in all these courts, was what we today would
call “equitable” process, or “equity,” although the heart of equity
jurisprudence remained the Chancery. The most fundamental dif-
ference between common-law pleading and equity, besides the ab-
sence of the jury, was the greater discretion of the judge and the
relative simplicity of the “bills” and pleading practice, at least in the
earlier centuries.39
The difference was reinforced by ideological tension between the
practitioners. The common-law barristers who practiced in the com-
mon- law courts were trained in the Inns of Court in London—
private guilds with no university connections.40 Indeed, no “com-
mon law” was taught in any English university until Blackstone’s
lectures at Oxford in 1753. But under the sponsorship of the
Tudors, a rival professional group emerged, the Doctors of Civil
Law of Doctors’ Commons, London. Members of this group all had
university doctorates earned in Roman and civil law, and had a mo-
nopoly on proceedings in the Requests and the Admiralty.41 Com-
mon-law lawyers and the civilian Doctors could both appear in
Chancery proceedings.
38. For examples of equitable “bills,” see id. at 202–04; see also C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY
AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 298–307, 321, 329 (1949).
39. See CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 383–425 (7th ed. 1964); IX WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 335–53 (3d ed. 1945); Subrin, supra note 31, at R
918–21.
40. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 177–99; ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH R
LAW 167–93 (1960). See generally WILFRID R. PREST, THE INNS OF COURT UNDER ELIZABETH I
AND THE EARLY STUARTS, 1550-1640 1–46 (1972) (explaining the social history of the English
bar).
41. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE CIVILIAN WRITERS OF DOCTORS’ COMMONS, LONDON
22–32 (1988). See generally BRIAN P. LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND, 1603–1641
(1973) (illustrating the life of civil lawyers in early seventeenth-century England); G. D.
SQUIBB, DOCTORS’ COMMONS (1977) (providing a history of society and its members).
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Not surprisingly, the common lawyers were suspicious of the dis-
cretionary powers of the Lord Chancellor and resented competi-
tion from the Doctors, especially with regard to the latter’s lucrative
monopoly in the Admiralty.42 It was particularly troubling that no
client had an absolute “right” to equitable relief in the Chancery.
Subjective “equitable” factors—including the familiar “clean hands”
doctrine and a traditional concern for the weak and vulnerable, to-
gether with the freedom of the equity judge (at least in theory)
from prior precedents—caused suspicion and unease among this
common law professional class. After all, the common lawyers made
their living protecting the private interests of merchants and a
landed squirearchy that sought, above all, predictability of outcome
and security of property. This was a professional and ideological
tension that would survive the English Civil War and last for centu-
ries.43 Indeed, as Stephen Subrin has brilliantly demonstrated, this
tension persisted through the history of American procedural re-
form, from Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Equity Pleading of 1834 to
the Field Code of 1848, the Thorp Code of 1897, and, finally, the
ultimate victory of the ideology of equitable pleading in the Ena-
bling Act of 1934 and Charles Clark’s “equity-prone view of proce-
dure” that would dominate the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.44
II. RULEMAKING AS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE
The profound influence of traditional English equity and its ide-
ology on modern American civil procedure, so brilliantly described
by the likes of Subrin, Burbank, and Cooper, is clearly beyond the
scope of this paper.45 But the law of equitable pleading, which,
borrowing Maitland’s words, would so influence the “kingless com-
monwealth” beyond the seas, did not spring, fully formed, from the
medieval practices of the Chancery or even those of the sixteenth
century.46 One great figure, an innovative genius of the first order,
would make the conceptual breakthrough in law reform that would
42. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 41, at 97–148. R
43. Id. at 149–97.
44. Subrin, supra note 31, at 963, 961–82. R
45. See, for example, the classic Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Edward H. Cooper, Extraordinary Writ Practice in Criminal
Cases: Analogies for the Military Courts, 98 F.R.D. 539 (1983); Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation
and Choice of Law, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 12 (2009); Subrin, supra note 31. R
46. Maitland was speaking of the common lawyers: “Those few men who were gathered
at Westminster round Pateshull and Raleigh and Bracton were penning writs that would run
in the name of kingless commonwealths on the other shore of the Atlantic Ocean; they were
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equip equitable pleading for its rule as an ideological conqueror.
Much admired, feared, and hated, this man was Francis Bacon
(1561–1626).
Bacon’s genius as the literal inventor of modern inductive social
science, his extraordinary power as a writer, and his rise politically
to be the second most powerful man in the England of his day, Vice
Regent to James I, has historically overshadowed the fact that, first
and foremost, he was a lawyer.47 Born to a father who was the head
of the Chancery Court, Lord Keeper Sir Nicholas Bacon (Elizabeth
I did not ennoble her “Lord Chancellors”), and a mother, Lady
Ann Bacon, the Calvinist sister-in-law of William Cecil (Lord Burgh-
ley, Lord Treasurer, and probably the richest man in England), Ba-
con would have appeared to be “to the manor born.” In retrospect,
that Bacon became Lord Chancellor himself, and head of the
Chancery Court like his father, would seem to be an obvious
outcome of his “wiring.” Indeed, Queen Elizabeth herself had, re-
portedly, “ ‘delighted to confer with him’ as a boy” and called him
“the young Lord Keeper.”48 A distinguished legal career seemed
practically guaranteed.
But in fact, nothing could have been further from the truth. The
youngest of eight children, six by a former marriage, Bacon was
slighted by his father’s will.49 His early life was a constant struggle
for education and preferment, and, despite appeals to his wealthy
uncle, Lord Burghley, Bacon was very much on his own. Queen
Elizabeth, a shrewd judge of character, distrusted him, and forced
Bacon to betray his one true friend and supporter, the Earl of Es-
sex. Bacon’s testimony would lead to Essex’s execution,50 the first of
many blots on Bacon’s character.
But Bacon did manage, at age twelve, to matriculate at the great
Trinity College, Cambridge, where he is today regarded as one of
many outstanding graduates. He entered, at age fifteen, Gray’s Inn
making right and wrong for us and for our children.” FREDERIC POLLOCK & FREDERICK WIL-
LIAM MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 705 (2d ed.
1968). In terms of “right and wrong,” he could even more accurately be describing the Lord
Chancellors and equity.
47. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 3–4. R
48. Id. at 23–24; see BOWEN, supra note 1, at 30–31. R
49. In Bacon’s words, “For my father, though I think I had greatest part in his love of all
his children, yet in his wisdom served me as last comer.” Id. at 41.
50. See BOWEN, supra note 1, at 75–80; MATHEWS, supra note 3, at 30–59. R
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of the Inns of Court, to train as a common lawyer. His statue now
dominates the Gray’s Inn first square.51
Deliberately passed over by Elizabeth, Bacon and his natural
brother, Anthony, conspired secretly with her heir, James VI of
Scotland. On Elizabeth’s death, Bacon and his brother quickly solic-
ited James, now James I of England and preferment followed.52
Bacon and Anthony were homosexuals, and were at ease in the
predominantly gay court of James I.53 But far more importantly,
James was a genuine intellectual, perhaps the most intelligent En-
glish monarch of all time.54 He quickly recognized that Bacon was a
genius, first appointing him King’s Counsel in 1604, and following
many other positions to be discussed below, ultimately Lord Chan-
cellor, in 1618. James I also ennobled Bacon as Baron Verulam in
1618, and then as Viscount St. Alban in 1621. Bacon’s cynical mar-
riage in 1606, at age forty-five, to fourteen-year-old heiress Alice
Barnham ensured wealth.55
Bacon was legally trained, apprenticed as a lawyer, and from 1608
until his elevation to Lord Keeper in 1617, was Treasurer of Gray’s
Inn, one of the four great legal guilds of London. His legal argu-
ments, particularly against Edward Coke in the famous, law-altering
Chudleigh’s Case (1594) and Slade’s Case (1602), and his legal read-
ings, such as the famous “On the Statute of Uses” at Gray’s Inn in
1600, were outstanding. Perhaps the greatest of his writings was the
immortal essay Of Judicature of 1612.56
But today, scientists from astrophysicists to cancer researchers
are turning once again to the inductive scientific method Bacon
51. See [RT. HON. ARTHUR BALFOUR], THE UNVEILING OF THE STATUTE OF FRANCIS BACON
(1912); COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 23–24; see also Daniel R. Coquillette, “The Purer Founda- R
tions”: Bacon and Legal Education, in FRANCIS BACON AND THE REFIGURING OF EARLY MODERN
THOUGHT 147–52 (Julie Robin Solomon & Catherne Gimelli Martin eds., 2005).
52. See BOWEN, supra note 1, at 97–101; COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 70. R
53. See Alan Bray, Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friendship in Elizabethan England,
HISTORY WORKSHOP, no. 29, 1990, at 1, 14 (quoting Simonds D’Ewes’ claim that Bacon was a
known “sodomite”); Charles R. Forker, Sexuality and Eroticism on the Renaissance Stage, 7 S.
CENT. REV., no. 4, 1990, at 1, 2 (“Francis Bacon, according to the gossipy John Aubrey, was a
well-known pederast.”). Francis Bacon’s brother, Anthony, was formally accused of sodomy in
France. Id. See generally DAPHNE DU MAURIER, GOLDEN LADS: A STUDY OF ANTHONY BACON,
FRANCIS AND THEIR FRIENDS (1975) (discussing the sexual atmosphere of James I’s court);
COQUILLETTE, supra note 3, at 70 (describing when Bacon was knighted, along with 300 R
others, to mark the King’s Coronation).
54. See generally THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES I (1918) [hereinafter, JAMES, POLITICAL
WORKS]; COQUILLETTE, supra note 12, at 328–31. Of course, here is a genuine example of R
where some of the work may be Bacon’s. Thus, James I’s “Charge to the Judiciary,” see JAMES,
POLITICAL WORKS, 326–27, 333–35, reads very close to Bacon’s essay Of Judicature, in ESSAIES
OF FRANCIS BACON (2d ed. 1613), and in Spedding vol. VI, supra note 2, at 582–87. R
55. COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 90, 315–20; BOWEN, supra note 1, at 131–74. R
56. Id. at 192–96.
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pioneered and praise Bacon’s invention of linguistics and empirical
social science. Bacon’s New Atlantis (1624) predicted submarines,
airplanes, refrigerators, terrorism, and research universities, thus at-
tracting thousands of fanatically devoted followers. Bacon’s spectac-
ular political advocacy of authoritarian Stuart divine right
monarchy—later amplified by Bacon’s secretary, Thomas Hobbes—
has earned him the everlasting hatred of Whig historians and lib-
eral political philosophers.57 In light of all this, Bacon the lawyer
just gets lost.
Nevertheless, Bacon was a lawyer first and foremost, and as Lord
Chancellor, he was the powerful head of the foremost equity juris-
diction in England. Author of two of the greatest essays on law re-
form, A Proposition to His Majesty Touching the Compiling and
Amendment of the Laws of England (1610) (hereinafter A Proposition)
and An Offer to the King of a Digest to Be Made of the Laws of England
(1621) (hereinafter A Digest),58 it is this Bacon who provided what it
took to transform the traditional equity jurisprudence into the
force that touched Charles Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A. Francis Bacon’s “New Tools”: The Two Books . . . Of the
Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Divine and
Humane (1605) and The Novum Organum (1620)—
A Progressive, Empirical Legal Philosophy
To understand Bacon’s jurisprudential genius, one must begin
with his revolutionary scientific thought. Long before his legal ca-
reer took off under James I, Bacon published his first great treatise
on inductive method, The Two Books . . . Of the Proficience and Ad-
vancement of Learning, Divine and Humane (1605) (hereinafter The
Advancement of Learning).59 Overshadowed by one of the first acts of
modern terrorism, the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 that nearly de-
stroyed both Houses of Parliament—including Bacon as an M.P.
and the King himself60—the Advancement of Learning is considered a
57. Id. at 277–97. On Bacon’s great scientific importance, see SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RA-
TIONALISM: BACON AND DESCARTES 15–18 (Norman F. Cantor & Peter L. Klein eds., 1969); I.
BERNARD COHEN, REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE 147–51 (1985).
58. Spedding vol. XIII, supra note 2, at 61 (A Proposition); Spedding vol. XIV, supra note R
4, at 357 (A Digest). R
59. Spedding vol. III, supra note 2, at 253 (The Advancement of Learning). It was dedicated R
to James I. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 77–90. R
60. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 77; WALKER, supra note 14, at 545. R
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masterpiece of modern English prose.61 More to the point, it re-
jected the traditional deductive, Aristotelian philosophy that domi-
nated English university learning for centuries.
This was of direct relevance to English law. Bacon’s thesis was
that genuine learning was based on direct observation of nature,
whether that be weather (Bacon invented modern meteorology),
astronomy, biology, or human nature itself. In short, it started with
observable facts and worked upwards to general propositions. In Ba-
con’s later expansion of the Advancement of Learning, called De Aug-
mentis (1623), barriers to accurate empirical study are explored with
great genius: the “flaws” in the lens caused by the individual psyche
(the “idols of the cave”); the prejudices of the ethnic community
(the “idols of the tribe”); the barrier of linguistics and communica-
tion (the “idols of the marketplace”); and, most importantly, the
artificial realities of religion, politics, and ideology (hence the
“idols of the theater,” drama being a compelling but artificial sim-
plification of the real world).62
Law, in the ideology of the medieval common law, evolved from
“time out of mind,” incorporating God’s will and wisdom into na-
tional culture. Whether one was the author of Bracton, Sir Edward
Coke, or Sir William Blackstone, to question such a manifestation
of the folk culture of a nation on empirical grounds was like chal-
lenging the existence of God.63 Law reform inevitably had to be
incremental and, in most cases, shrouded by “legal fiction” (i.e.,
essential legal changes made in practice although denied in
theory).64
Bacon hated all fictions and all “top-down” legitimation of
human learning, be it physics or legal rules. Why should a legal
process be tested by anything but its actual success in practice, case
61. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE 58 (Margaret Drabble ed., 5th
rev. ed. 1995) (describing Bacon’s prose as generally being “rich, ornate, and supple”).
62. COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 228–34; Spedding vol. IV, supra note 2, at 53–54 (list- R
ing the four classes of idols); see also Walter H. O’Briant, The Genesis, Definition, and Classifica-
tion of Bacon’s Idols, 13 S. J. PHIL. 347, 348–57 (1975).
63. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67–68; EDWARD
COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1826) (“[T]he common law
of England had been time out of mind before the Conquest and was not altered by the
Conqueror.”); COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 314. R
64. In Maine’s words, “ ‘[l]egal Fiction’. . . [signifies] any assumption which conceals, or
affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter remaining
unchanged, its operation being modified.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 24 (1864); see
COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 305 (“The lawyers’ pretenses are not consciously deceptive. R
The lawyers themselves, like the laymen, fail to recognize fully the essentially plastic and
mutable character of law.”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 10 (1970); See also id.
at 338–39. For a modern “critical” attack on Blackstone, see Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 209–11, 381–82 (1979).
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by case? More to the point, why should legal rules be “deduced” by
judges in cases or controversies from a “fundamental” law or juris-
prudence—a process inherently “after the fact”—thus denying the
certainty that would permit citizens the ability to govern their con-
duct by clear prospective rules? In Bacon’s view, the first virtue of a
just legal system was certainty, and that meant a prospective, not a
retroactive, system.65
Even more important, in Bacon’s inductive method, all rules—
whether they purport to be rules of physics, linguistics, meteorol-
ogy, or law—must continually be tested by empirical study. Valida-
tion by empirical research, in Bacon’s method, is the only true
source of legitimacy. All other deduced tests of theory, whether
from theology or mathematics, must give way to systematic observa-
tion, free of bias.66
For nearly three hundred years, Bacon’s inductive scientific
method was attacked by Newtonian formalists, mathematicians de-
voted to a purely abstract science, and those who saw the scientific
method as driven by preordained hypotheses.67 Only today, with the
collapse of Newtonian physics, the radical discoveries of modern
astrophysics—unpredicted by mathematical models—and the fail-
ure of “solutions”-driven research in cancer and other biomedical
fields, have scientists rediscovered the value of starting with basic,
“pure” research in physics, astronomy, biochemistry, and many
other sciences, abandoning pre-determined hypotheses as an inher-
ent source of bias—an “idol” blocking real understanding.68
Bacon saw clearly that this inductive method was also key to real
law reform. Rules must operate clearly and prospectively to achieve
certain social ends. Their adoption should hardly guarantee their
survival. Rather, they should be continuously tested, empirically, sci-
entifically, and objectively, to determine if they achieve the ends for
which they were designed. That scientific inductive process—and
only that process—validates rules.69
65. See FRANCIS BACON, OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 294–95 (1674) (Title I—Of
the First Dignity of Laws, That They Be Certain). Aphorism VIII reads, “Certainty is so Essential to
a Law, as without it a Law cannot be Just . . . .” Id. at 294 (emphasis in original). See also
COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 334–35 (citing BACON, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING). R
66. See Jerry Weinberger, Francis Bacon and the Unity of Knowledge, Reason and Revelation, in
FRANCIS BACON AND THE REFIGURING OF EARLY MODERN THOUGHT 109–27 (Julie Robin Solo-
mon & Catherine Gimelli Martin eds., 2005).
67. See I. BERNARD COHEN, REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE 147–51 (1985). Cohen notes further
that “One of the conspicuous failures in Bacon’s concept of science is in not recognizing the
important role of mathematics in scientific theory.” Id. at 145.
68. See id. at 159–60.
69. COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 277–92. He also “understood the futility of the pro- R
cess/substance distinction in law. It was fine to discuss a ‘rule’ in the abstract, but the impor-
tant issue was how it worked in the concrete.” Id. at 277.
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B. Bacon’s Progressive Legal Theory in Practice: A Proposition to His
Majesty Touching the Compiling and Amendment of
the Laws of England (1616–1617) and the
Ordinances in Chancery (1617–1620)
Bacon asserted his inductive, progressive legal philosophy in two
ways: in specific proposals for law reform and in the actual adoption
and enforcement of legal rules. The former approach culminated
in A Proposition, written when Bacon was Attorney General and in a
position to advocate directly to the King himself.70 The latter ap-
proach resulted in the actual adoption and enforcement of judicial
rules, the Ordinances of 1617–1620. These judicial rules were
adopted by Bacon’s authority after he was appointed Lord Keeper
in 1617 and given control of the Chancery and its key equity
jurisdiction.71
For Bacon, the initial opportunity for reform was James’s acces-
sion to the Throne of England in 1603, unifying the Crowns of
England and Scotland.72 This presented a theoretical opportunity
to reform the laws of both kingdoms to prepare for a future unifica-
tion and an obvious way to ingratiate himself with the King. Thus in
1603, just a year after James’s accession, Bacon wrote A Brief
Discourse Touching the Happy Union of the Kingdoms of England and
Scotland, followed shortly by the more substantive Certain Articles or
Considerations Touching the Union of the Kingdoms.73 The law of Scot-
land was definitely more indebted to “civilian,” Roman law influ-
ences. This gave Bacon the opportunity to argue, although in
general terms, for a general law reform project which would move
deductive common law “beliefs” toward a more instrumentalist,
comparative, and scientific view of law.74 In the short run, these pro-
posals turned out to be hopelessly optimistic. The actual unification
of the two Kingdoms did not occur until the Articles of Union in
1707, and the two legal systems have remained “very different” until
this very day.75
After Bacon was appointed Attorney General in 1613, his access
to James’s inner circle greatly increased, consolidated by his
70. See id. at 99–117.
71. See id. at 201–06.
72. The two kingdoms had separate laws and governments. It was James’s great desire to
see a complete unification, including the legal system. See 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1062–63 (1976).
73. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 70–77. See Spedding vol. X, supra note 4, at 90, 218. R
74. COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 74–75. R
75. See WALKER, supra note 14 at 1108 (noting that Scottish law is “very different from R
that existing [today] in England and Wales”).
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appointment as Privy Counsellor in 1616. Between 1614 and 1615,
Bacon proposed a major law reform project, addressed to the King
as “A Memorial Touching the Reviews of Penal Laws and the
Amendment of Common Law” (hereinafter, The Memorial). It pro-
posed a Commission, consisting of “12 Lawyers and 12 Gentlemen
of experience in the Country, for the review of penal laws and the
repeal of such as are obsolete and snaring, and the supply where it
shall be needful of laws more mild and fit for the time.”76 The goal
of this Commission would be “to prepare bills for the next
Parliament.”77
Although, as we shall see, Bacon was quick to use the judicial
authority as Lord Chancellor to adopt procedural rules directly, he
also was an experienced member of Parliament, having first been
elected in 1581 at the age of only twenty for the seat of Bossing in
Cornwall. He remained active in the House for the next thirty-seven
years, until he was disqualified by being ennobled in 1618.78 No one
understood better than Bacon what was best left to the legislature.
But The Memorial also addressed matters “which Needeth No Par-
liament.” In particular, Bacon argued that the King, of his inherent
authority, could “reform the body of their Laws,” by reviewing the
reported cases of judicial decisions. “[I]t is hardly possible to confer
upon this kingdom a greater benefit than if his Majesty should be
pleased that these books also may be purged and reviewed, whereby
they may be reduced to fewer volumes and clearer resolutions.”79
No wonder the common law judges and lawyers feared this man.
Here was revision and “reform” of reported judicial decisions by
executive fiat. But Bacon had a point. The existing law reports were
unofficial, unreliable, and of greatly varying quality. What is worse,
some, like the immortal Law Reports of Sir Edward Coke, were writ-
ten by the judge himself. Modern research has shown that Coke
notoriously “revised” his Reports to reflect not what was actually
done, but what he thought should have been done.80 Not until 1865,
when the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and
76. Spedding vol. XII, supra note 2, at 84–85. R
77. Id. at 85.
78. COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 311–19 (listing a chronology of Bacon’s career). R
79. Spedding vol. XII, supra note 2, at 85. R
80. See JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE REPORTERS (4th ed. 1882), 165–96. Sir Edward
Sugden observed of Coke’s Reports,
Let not our just admiration of Sir Edward Coke’s profound legal learning carry us too
far. His system of turning every judgment into a string of general propositions and
resolutions has certainly a very imposing appearance, but it is a system of all others the
least calculated to transmit a faithful report . . . the bias of a man’s own sentiments
may involuntarily lead him to pervert the opinions of others in order to support his
own.
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Wales was established, was there any official “quality control,” and
even then there was no monopoly on reporting.81
Bacon saw all this clearly and, to his credit, made a radical propo-
sal that would have greatly increased the legitimacy of the decided
case law: a system of official reporters. In making his argument, Ba-
con ingeniously referred to a “tradition” that never existed: “[H]is
Majesty may be pleased to restore the ancient use of Reporters,
which in former times were persons of great learning, which did
attend the Courts at Westminster, and did carefully and faithfully
receive the Rules and Judicial Resolutions given in the King’s
Courts, and had stipends of the Crown for the same.”82 Bacon then
proposed six specific individuals and a stipend that could not “be
less than 100£ per annum.”83 He could not resist a closing slash at
his rival, Chief Justice Coke:
It is true that this [reporting] hath been supplied somewhat of
later times by the industry of voluntaries, as chiefly by the wor-
thy endeavours of the Lord Dier and the Lord Coke. But great
Judges are unfit persons to be reporters, for they have either
too little leisure or too much authority, as may appear well by
those two books, whereof that of my Lord Dier is but a kind of
note book, and those of my Lord Cokes hold too much de
proprio.84
Had Bacon’s proposal for official reporters “of great learning”
been adopted, the influence of the common law precedents could
have been greatly strengthened. As it happened, this reform would
have to wait for centuries, despite the accidental appearance of
great “informal” Reporters, such as Sir James Burrow, who reported
the King’s Bench from 1756–1772 (he made “an epoch in the his-
tory of reporting”). The first true official reporters were only ap-
pointed in 1865.85 No wonder Bacon, as a legal scientist devoted to
transparency and certainty, was skeptical of the reported precedent
of his day.
The culmination of Bacon’s efforts for a major project of law re-
form occurred in the period between June, 1616 and March, 1617,
Id. at 172. See generally V WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 423–93 (3d ed.
1945) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH vol. V].
81. WALKER, supra note 14, at 730. R
82. Spedding vol. XII, supra note 2, at 86. R
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. WALLACE, supra note 80, at 446–47; BAKER, supra note 13, at 211. On the origins of R
the first official Law Reports in 1865 by the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for En-
gland and Wales, see WALKER, supra note 14, at 730. R
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immediately before Bacon’s appointment as Lord Keeper of the
Seal, replacing Lord Chancellor Ellesmere as head of the Chancery
Court. Addressed directly to the King himself, Bacon’s “A Proposi-
tion” was a masterpiece, a complete program of fundamental law
reform.86
Bacon’s starting proposition was simple. There was a lot that was
good about the current state of English law, but it was far from
perfect. On the one hand, worshipping the common-law status quo
was absurd, but radical reform, without respect for what experience
had established, was equally foolish. Here Bacon made a generous
compliment to his arch-rival, common law conservative Chief Jus-
tice Coke.
Sir, I shall not fall into either of those two extremes concern-
ing the laws of England; they commend themselves best to
them that understand them; and your Majesty’s Chief Justice
[Coke] of your Bench hath in his writings magnified them not
without cause. Certainly they are wise, they are just, and mod-
erate laws; they give to God, they give to Caesar, they give to
the subjects, that which appertaineth. It is true, they are as
mixt as our language, compounded of British, Roman, Saxon,
Danish, Norman customs. And as our language is so much the
richer, so the laws are the more complete: neither doth this
attribute less to them, than those that would have them to
have stood out the same in all mutations; for no tree is so good
first set, as by transplanting.87
But the existing legal system urgently needed work:
But certain it is, that our laws, as they now stand, are subject to
great uncertainties, and variety of opinion, delays, and eva-
sions: whereof ensueth,
1. That the multiplicity and length of suits is great.
2. That the contentious person is armed, and the honest sub-
ject wearied and oppressed.
3. That the judge is more absolute; who, in doubtful cases,
hath a greater stroke and liberty.
4. That the chancery courts are more filled, the remedy of
law being often obscure and doubtful.
86. COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 99–117; Spedding vol. XIII, supra note 2, at 61–71. R
87. Spedding vol. XIII, supra note 2, at 63. R
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5. That the ignorant lawyer shroudeth his ignorance of law
in that doubts are so frequent and many.
6. That men’s assurances of their lands and estates by pat-
ents, deeds, wills, are often subject to question, and
hollow; and many the like inconveniences.88
The answer? A wholesale analysis of the actual application of the
English law, resulting in two great initiatives, one directed at the
common law and the other at the statutory law, tested in both cases
by actual application. In Bacon’s immortal words, “Books must fol-
low sciences, and not sciences books.”89
The common law initiative was to be divided in three parts. First,
a legal history book, De antiquitatibus juris, would be written and a
new registry of the legal records “in your Tower or elsewhere . . .
searched perused and weighed.”90 These were to be used for “rever-
end precedents” but not as “binding authorities.”91 Bacon’s purpose
was to distinguish between the history of the law and its active, pre-
sent application—exactly what the Historical Appendices of Moore’s
Federal Practice and other major treatises have sought to achieve.
Why? Because in Bacon’s view, the constant reference of common
law judges to a sanctified law dating to “time immemorial” was a
fiction, masking in antiquarian terms what was, in fact, modern in-
novation. Separating legal history from present “binding prece-
dent” was a first step to transparency.
The second part was to be the equivalent of the great Digest of
Roman Law, containing all valid, authoritative precedents summa-
rized and organized by topic. Erroneous cases, repetitious cases,
and the “idle queries” of common law reporting would be “purged
away,” and those cases of “too great prolixity . . . drawn into a more
compendious report.”92 This precursor of today’s American Law In-
stitute Restatements would be a core of legal authority, consistent
and available to all. Bacon added again a plea for professional, ob-
jective Reporters: “[I]t resteth but for your Majesty to appoint some
grave and sound lawyers, with some honourable stipend, to be
reporters.”93
88. Id. at 64. This list by Bacon sounds very much like the reasons for the 2010 Civil
Litigation Review Conference at Duke, which was sponsored by the Civil Rules Advisory Com-
mittee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See John G. Koeltl, 2010 Civil Litigation
Review Conference, 60 DUKE L.J. 537, 537 (2010).
89. Spedding vol. XIII, supra note 2, at 67. R
90. Id. at 68.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 69.
93. Id.
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Finally, Bacon would have three “anxiliary books”: (1) an author-
itative law dictionary, De verborum significationibus, a precursor of
Bryan Garner’s Black’s Law Dictionary;94 (2) an official textbook for
students, the Institutions, modeled on Justinian’s great Roman law
text, “wherewith students begin”; and most importantly, (3) a book
of judicial rules, De regulis juris.95 This book of rules would directly
challenge the judicial decisions of Coke’s Reports as a primary source
of law, and Bacon was to write it himself:
For the treatise De regulis juris, I hold it of all other things the
most important to the health, as I may term it, and good insti-
tutions of any laws: it is indeed like the ballast of a ship, to
keep all upright and stable; but I have seen little in this kind,
either in our law or other laws, that satisfieth me. The naked
rule or maxim doth not the effect. It must be made useful by
good differences, ampliations, and limitations, warranted by
good authorities; and this not by raising up of quotations and
references, but by discourse and deducement in a just tractate.
In this I have travelled myself, at the first more cursorily, since
with more diligence, and will go on with it, if God and your
Majesty will give me leave. And I do assure your Majesty, I am
in good hope, that when Sir Edward Coke’s Reports and my
Rules and Decisions shall come to posterity, there will be
(whatsoever is now thought,) question who was the greater
lawyer?96
Alas, Bacon’s book of rules was never written.
The concluding part of Bacon’s great law reform project would
be a great codification of all statutory law. It would have four goals:
1. The first, to discharge the books of those statutes whereas
the case by alteration of time is vanished; as Lombard Jews,
Gauls half-pence, etc. Those may nevertheless remain in
the libraries for antiquities, but no reprinting of them.
The like of statutes long since expired and clearly re-
pealed; for if the repeal be doubtful, it must be so pro-
pounded to the Parliament.
2. The next is, to repeal all statutes which are sleeping and
not of use, but yet snaring and in force. In some of those it
94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
95. Spedding vol. XIII, supra note 2, at 70. R
96. Id.
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will perhaps be requisite to substitute some more reasona-
ble law instead of them, agreeable to the time; in others a
simple repeal may suffice.
3. The third, that the greviousness of the penalty in many
statutes be mitigated, though the ordinance stand.
4. The last is, the reducing of concurrent statutes, heaped
one upon another, to one clear and uniform law.97
But, as Bacon pointed out, these changes would have to be made
by Parliament, and all that the King could effectively do would be to
call for “commissioners named by both houses; but not with a pre-
cedent power to conclude, but only to prepare and propound to
Parliament.”98 Thus, Bacon continued to respect the proper power
of the legislature. Alas, this great proposal would also have to wait
three centuries for even partial implementation, which occurred in
the great nineteenth-century codification movements on both sides
of the Atlantic.99
But Bacon was not just a brilliant advocate and theorist of law
reform. When he had both the power and the jurisdiction, he
boldly implemented reform in practice. The power and jurisdiction
came to him with his appointment as Lord Keeper of the Seal on
March 3, 1617 and then as Lord Chancellor on January 4, 1618—
moments of great pride to Bacon as he finally, against all odds,
stepped into the shoes of his father. In the words of Bacon’s friend,
the immortal poet Ben Johnson,
Son to the grave, wise
Keeper of the Seal,
Fame, and foundation
Of the English weal.
What then his father was,
P]that since is he . . . .100
As Lord Chancellor, Bacon inherited both the civilian heritage of
equitable procedure and great judicial discretionary power.
97. Id. at 71.
98. Id.
99. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 506–12; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF R
AMERICAN LAW 403–11 (2d ed. 1985); ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
335–39 (1966); A.H. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES
1750–1930, at 13–20, 23–26, 38–49 (1980).
100. COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 191; see also BOWEN, supra note 1, at 172. R
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Equitable procedure had given rise to rules of Chancery proce-
dure as early as the sixteenth century, brilliantly described by Paul
Ward.101 But the early efforts, most importantly described by Wil-
liam Lambarde’s Chancery notebooks, were primitive and
disjointed compared to Bacon’s pioneering effort, the Ordinances in
Chancery.
The Ordinances were written between 1617 and 1620 as Bacon es-
tablished control of the Chancery. They are known to us from a
number of surviving manuscripts and were printed as early as 1642,
but the revised edition of James Spedding, published in 1879, is
regarded as definitive.102
The Ordinances consist of 101 rules.103 They have a very clear inter-
nal structure, which seems instantly familiar to modern procedural-
ists. In particular, Rules 1 to 5 set out how one could appeal a
decree of the Chancery (i.e., “bills of review”). The fundamental
principle is that “no bill of review shall be admitted . . . except the
decree be first obeyed and performed” (Rule 3) unless the “act de-
creed to be done . . . extinguisheth the parties’ right at common
law” (Rule 4).104
Rule 6 sets out the power of the legislature as a fundamental limi-
tation on the equity jurisdiction:
No decrees shall be made, upon pretence of equity, against
the express provision of an act of parliament: nevertheless if
the construction of such act of parliament hath for a time
gone one way in general opinion and reputation, and after by
a later judgment hath been controlled, then relief may be
given upon matter of equity for cases arising before the said
judgment; because the subject was in no default.105
101. See Paul L. Ward, William Lambarde’s Collection on Chancery, 7 HARV. LIBR. BULL. 271,
280–86, 291–92 (1953). My special thanks to Karen Beck, colleague and curator ex-
traordinaire, for this source.
102. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 201–06; Spedding vol. VII, supra note 2, at 757–74 R
(containing the complete Ordinances). The Ordinances appeared in print as early as 1642,
when they were printed in London for Mathew Walbanke and Lawrence Chapman. See FRAN-
CIS BACON, ORDINANCES MADE BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR FRANCIS BACON (1642), reprinted
in FRANCIS BACON, LAW TRACTS 279–98 [hereinafter LAW TRACTS] (2d ed. 1741). Again, my
special thanks to Karen Beck.
103. See Spedding vol. VII, supra note 2, at 757. Spedding observed that “[i]n Harl. MSS. R
1576—in which volume are also some Orders of Lord Ellesmere—there are fifteen addi-
tional rules, which from the place in which they occur would seem to be Bacon’s.” Id. Since
Spedding omitted these and it remains uncertain that they were authored by Bacon, they are
not discussed here.
104. LAW TRACTS, supra note 102, at 280. R
105. Spedding vol. VII, supra note 2, at 760. The other great limitation on equity was that R
no equitable remedy could be available if there was a remedy at common law.
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This is followed by remedies available in Chancery (Rules 7–10),
a description of those bound and not bound by the remedies
(Rules 11–12), the different ways in which causes may be dismissed
after hearing (Rules 13–17), a prohibition against “double vexa-
tion” by suing “for the same cause at the common law and in chan-
cery” (Rule 18), and the procedure for removal of causes by
certiorari (Rule 19).106
The Ordinances then focus on special forms of relief familiar to all
students of equity: injunction (Rules 20–28), sequestration (Rules
29–30), enforcement of the decrees of other courts that “are by
contumacy or other means interrupted” (Rules 31–32), and suits
after judgment (Rules 33–34). Careful regard is given not to alter
or undercut the judgments of the other royal courts. Thus, as Rule
34 stipulates,
Decrees upon suits brought after judgment shall contain no
words to make void or weaken the judgment, but shall only
correct the corrupt conscience of the party, and rule him to
make restitution, or perform other acts, according to the eq-
uity of the cause.107
The Ordinances then turn to their most fascinating subject: the
direct regulation of the court officials—the “Registrars” and “Mas-
ters” and the attorneys appearing before them. Here we can see a
microcosm of a busy legal community, subject to the usual risks of
corruption, evasion, and inaccuracy. For example, the Chancery
Registrars (spelt “registers” by Bacon) were charged with the draw-
ing up of decrees but were quite capable of playing favorites both in
the wording of the decrees and by delaying entry.108 Rules 35 to 44
deal with various possible Registrar abuses, and Rules 37 and 38
address delays, inaccuracies, and private dealings by Registrars:
37. No order shall be explained upon any private petition, but
in court as they are made, and the register is to set down the
orders as they were pronounced by the court truly, at his peril,
without troubling the lord chancellor, by any private attending
of him, to explain his meaning; and if any explanation be de-
sired, it is to be done by public motion, where the other party
may be heard.
106. Id. at 760–62.
107. Id. at 764.
108. See HOLDSWORTH vol. V, supra note 80, at 252–53. R
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38. No draught of any order shall be delivered by the register
to either party, without keeping a copy by him; to the end that
if the order be not entered, nevertheless the court may be in-
formed what was formerly done, and not put to new trouble
and hearing; and to the end also that knowledge of orders be
not kept back too long from either party, but may presently
appear at the office.109
In particular, the Registrars were not to be influenced in drafting
the decrees by counsel, even if “said counsel [be] never so great,”
and should be certain the Lord Chancellor understood the signifi-
cance of the orders when asked to sign them.110 Rules 40 and 41
state:
40. The registers, upon sending their draught unto the coun-
sel of the parties, are not to respect the interlineations or alter-
ations of the said counsel, be the said counsel never so great,
farther than to put them in remembrance of that which was
truly delivered in court, and so to conceive the order, upon
their oath and duty, without any farther respect.
41. The registers are to be careful in the penning and drawing
up of decrees, and specially in matters of difficulty and weight;
and therefore when they present the same to the lord chancel-
lor, they ought to give him understanding which are such de-
crees of weight, that they may be read and reviewed before his
lordship sign them.111
Similar rules govern references to Masters, for example in Rules 45
to 52.112
Of particular interest are the Rules governing sanctions. These
routinely included the lawyers, as well as their clients. “Prolixity”
was a particular concern. Thus, Rule 55 states:
55. If any bill, answer, replication, or rejoinder, shall be found
of an immoderate length, both the party and the counsel
under whose hand it passeth shall be fined.113
109. Spedding vol. VII, supra note 2, at 764–65. R
110. Id. at 765.
111. Id. at 765.
112. See id. at 765–66.
113. Id. at 767.
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Prior Lord Chancellors did not just fine those who failed to be
concise. For example, take the fate of the unfortunate Richard Myl-
ward, who filed a replication that “ ‘doth contain 6 score Sheets of
paper [120 pages] and yet the matter which is pertinent and of sub-
stance contained therein might well have been contrived in 16
Sheets of paper.’ ”114 Lord Keeper Egerton ordered
that the Warden of the Fleet shall take the said Richard Myl-
ward . . . and shall bring him into Westminster Hall, on Satur-
day next, about ten of the clock in the forenoon, and then and
there shall cut a hole in the myddest of the same engrossed
replication (which is delivered unto him for that purpose),
and put the said Richard’s head through the same hole, and so
let the same replication hang about his shoulders, with the
written side outward; and then, the same so hanging, shall
lead the same Richard, bare headed and bare faced, round
about Westminster Hall, whilst the Courts are sitting, and shall
shew him at the bar of every of the three Courts within the
Hall, and shall then take him back again to the Fleet, and keep
him prisoner, until he shall have paid 10 l. to Her Majesty for a
fine, and 20 nobles to the defendant.115
Another offense was filing a pleading that was “libelous or slan-
derous,” particularly with regard to non-parties or “in derogation of
the settled authority of any of His Majesty’s courts.”116 This included
sanctions for the lawyers. Rule 56 directs:
56. If there be contained in any bill, answer, or other plead-
ing, or any interrogatory, any matter libelous or slanderous
against any that is not party to the suit, or against such as are
parties to the suit upon matters impertinent, or in derogation
of the settled authority of any of His Majesty’s courts; such
bills, answers, pleadings, or interrogatories, shall be taken off
the file and suppressed, and the parties severally punished by
commitment or ignominy, as shall be thought fit, for the abuse
of the court: and the counselors at law, who have set their
hands, shall likewise receive reproof or punishment, if cause
be.117
114. Ward, supra note 101, at 284–85 (setting out the original manuscript transcripts of R
Cecil Monro, a nineteenth-century Chancery Registrar and historian).
115. Id. at 285 (quoting Monro’s transcript).
116. Spedding vol. VII, supra note 2, at 767. R
117. Sanctioning counsel for “derogation of the settled authority of any of His Majesty’s
courts” is reflected today in ABA Model Rule 8.2(a): “A lawyer shall not make a statement
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The Ordinances also controlled standard pleading matters, such as
demurrers (Rules 57–60), answers (Rules 61–66), depositions and
interrogatories (Rules 68–74), affidavits (Rules 75–76), petitions
(Rules 80–83), special writs (Rules 84–92), and special commissions
(Rules 93–97). The last offered the same potential for abuse as Reg-
istrars and Masters. Thus, Rules 96 and 97 direct:
96. No commission of bankrupt shall be granted but upon pe-
tition first exhibited to the lord chancellor, together with
names presented, of which his lordship will take considera-
tion, and always mingle some learned in the law with the rest;
yet so as care be taken that the same parties be not too often
used in commissions; and likewise care is to be taken that
bond with good surety be entered into, in 200l. at least, to
prove him a bankrupt.
97. No commission of delegates in any cause of weight shall
be awarded, but upon petition preferred to the lord chancel-
lor, who will name the commissioners himself, to the end they
may be persons of convenient quality, having regard to the
weight of the cause, and the dignity of the court from whence
the appeal is.118
Finally, there are Rules of general court administration, which
went from the very specific to the very general. These include the
very specific Rule 67, which stipulates the exact number of lines in
Chancery copies:
67. All copies in chancery shall contain fifteen lines in every
sheet thereof, written orderly and unwastefully, unto which
shall be subscribed the name of the principal clerk of the of-
fice where it is written, or his deputy, for whom he will answer,
for which only subscription no fee at all shall be taken.119
that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard to its truth or falsity concerning
the qualifications or integrity of a judge.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a). De-
spite the First Amendment, such sanctions have been enforced. See, e.g., In re Wilkins, 782
N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 2003) (finding attorney in violation of Rule 8.2 despite any First Amend-
ment protection of his remarks); In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604 (1982) (holding that attorneys
associated with an ongoing criminal trial making out-of-court statements about trial judges
may be sanctioned). But see In re Erdman, 301 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1973) (reversing disciplinary
sanctions against a criminal defense attorney who made offensive statements out of court in a
magazine).
118. Spedding vol. VII, supra note 2, at 773. R
119. Id. at 768.
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But there is also the very broad Rule 101, which contains general
authority to make new rules whenever needed:
101. And because time and experience may discover some of
these rules to be inconvenient, and some other to be fit to be
added; therefore his lordship intendeth in any such case from
time to time to publish any such revocations or additions.120
Also included are rules that governed such diverse matters as
who “shall be admitted to defend in forma pauperis” (Rule 98) and
licenses to collect “for losses by fire or water,” which are carefully
regulated by Rule 99. Insurance fraud was obviously a feature both
of seventeenth-century and modern litigation.
Bacon’s Ordinances do not seem remarkable to us. They operated
like modern rules of procedure and addressed many of the same
problems—problems that have obviously been endemic to law prac-
tice and court operations throughout the ages. But that is exactly
the point. These were truly modern rules of procedure, set in the
context of the same equitable jurisdiction that was to have such a
powerful influence on American rulemakers, three centuries later
and an ocean away. Bacon’s philosophy of inductive, empirical ob-
servation of rules in practice, and his theories of law reform, took
concrete form in his rulemaking. In modern parlance, Bacon did
not just “talk the talk” of modern law reform and rulemaking. In
the Ordinances, Bacon, as Lord Chancellor, “walked the walk.” It was
exactly the sort of thing that would impress a Charles Clark, a Ben
Kaplan, a Charles Wright, or an Edward Cooper.
III. “PAST THE PILLARS OF HERCULES”: HISTORICAL LINES OF
ATTACK ON FRANCIS BACON AND THEIR
SIGNIFICANCE TODAY
The title page of Bacon’s great Novum Organum (1620) bears a
striking illustration: a small brave ship passing under the Pillars of
Hercules, the traditional symbol of the end of the known world.121
It was a time of brave exploration of a New World. The opening
words of Bacon’s utopia, the New Atlantis, were, “We sailed from
Peru . . . for China and Japan, by the South Sea.”122 In 1620, the
Pillars of Hercules were powerfully symbolic, but not just of explo-
ration. Bacon’s scientific thought and his empirical theories of law
120. Id. at 774.
121. FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM (1620).
122. COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 258. R
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reform, which both went beyond the common-law tradition and the
comfort level of his peers, defied the ancient warning of the Pillars,
“non ultra” (“no further!”)
There is no space here to describe adequately the controversies
of Bacon’s life—personal, professional, philosophical, and politi-
cal.123 But he earned enemies in all four categories, both while he
lived and long after his death. I would like to focus solely on Ba-
con’s professional achievements, particularly in law reform and
rulemaking, and on just three sources of controversy. These
controversies have continued to the present day, and they are di-
rectly relevant to modern rulemaking. But the warning “non ultra”
and the symbolism of the Pillars of Hercules have hardly disap-
peared, and many still believe Bacon’s methods and theories go too
far. Here are three historic lines of attack on Bacon’s professional
theories of law reform and his rulemaking.
A. The Deductive, Formalist Attack: Edward Coke, William Blackstone,
Christopher Columbus Langdell—Rulemaking as Intellectually
and Morally Inferior to Case Law
Any first-year law student who has been told by a professor that
his or her answer to a legal question is “wrong” has been intro-
duced to legal formalism. As perfected by great common lawyers,
such as Bacon’s archenemy, Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke, the con-
cept of legal learning as a science of “artificial intelligence” was
initially deductive in its approach (i.e., there was an existing body of
legal learning from which answer to most legal questions could be
deduced).124 Thus, the judge would consider a particular case or
controversy and then apply the appropriate pre-existing legal rule
to achieve the “correct” answer—an answer that, in theory at least,
was independent from the political or economic forces of the day.
123. See id. at 275–97. For the master account of Baconian controversies, see generally
MATHEWS, supra note 3. R
124. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 312–25; HOLDSWORTH vol. V, supra note 80, at R
423–93. As Coke had the nerve to say directly to James I,
[T]hen the King said, that he thought the law was founded upon reason, and that he
and others had reason, as well as the Judges: to which it was answered by me, that . . .
His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which
concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be
decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of law . . . with
which the King was greatly offended.
Id. at 339 (italics added); accord Prohibitions del Roy, in 12 COKE’S REP. 63 (1608).
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Of course, law cannot evolve to meet changing social needs if this
model is strictly applied, and great legal historians, such as Sir
Henry Maine, early saw the use of “legal fictions” by judges as a way
to preserve familiar forms but also to achieve necessary reform.125
Unlike Maine’s other two modes of legal change, legislation and
equity, legal fiction changed crucial outcomes while denying—at
least formally—that the law itself had changed. The master of this
approach was Coke himself in major cases such as Slade’s Case
(1602).126
Formalism has been closely associated with Anglo-American legal
education, particularly professional university legal education, from
the earliest times. Sir William Blackstone’s famous Vinerian lectures
at Oxford in 1758 were the first to introduce the actual study of
English common law of the courts within a university framework,
and Blackstone’s resulting Commentaries (1765–1770) have become
a formalist bible. Today, legal scholars such as E. P. Thompson,
Douglas Hay of the Warwick School, and Duncan Kennedy have
demonstrated that Blackstone’s Commentaries did not accurately re-
present the actual practice of law or the operation of eighteenth-
century courts. But the four volumes of Blackstone, defining a
“body” of common law, were on George Washington’s shelves, in
Abraham Lincoln’s library as he rode the circuit in Illinois,127 and
were the cornerstones of the first law courses at the new Harvard
Law School in 1817.128
One feature of Coke and Blackstone’s formalism was the inher-
ent superiority of case law. The judge deduces and applies the law
in a case or controversy from the great pre-existing body of the law,
and the case becomes both a source and the manifestation of this
law. The purely instrumental aspect of legislation, which made no
pretense to legitimacy other than the vote of the legislature, and
the traditionally non-precedential principles of equity, which were
125. See MAINE, supra note 64, at 23–27. R
126. See Slade’s Case, in 4 COKE’S REP. 92(b) (1602). See generally COQUILLETTE, ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE supra note 10, at 250–54, 261–63, 310–61 (discussing Coke’s legal R
career and approach to deciding cases).
127. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 438; Mark E. Steiner, Abraham Lincoln and the R
Rules of Law Books, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1283, 1298–99 (2010).
128. COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 438. For Blackstone criticism, see, for example, R
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 209–11
(1979). See generally DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHT-
EENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 18–24 (1975); E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN
OF THE BLACK ACT 269 (1975). On Blackstone’s fundamental importance in early American
legal education, see ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 20–27 (1967); see also
COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 437–39. R
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validated solely by achieving a just end in a particular situation, did
not appeal to formalist curriculums.
The ultimate manifestation of American academic legal formal-
ism was, of course, Christopher Columbus Langdell and his famous
“case method,” first introduced by Langdell’s famous Cases on Con-
tracts (1870), the very first casebook. Although by 1870, codification
movements in both Europe and America had already been gather-
ing momentum, and commercial and contract law was an obvious
focus for such codes, no legislation intruded into most law school
classrooms.129 The extent of Langdell’s deductive formalism has
been exaggerated, particularly by twentieth-century “realist” critics,
but his emphasis on the inherent superiority of case law has domi-
nated the legal education of generations of American lawyers, right
to this very day.
This had a clear impact on the attitude of academia and students
to Baconian rulemaking. If the deduction of legal principles from a
pre-existing common law to cases or controversies is the correct
role of the judge, and if the evolution of common-law rules—usu-
ally by legal fiction—is the most legitimate and wise mode of law
reforms, the prospective enunciation of rules by judges in the ab-
stract is flawed in two ways. First, to the extent the judges are not
deciding cases based on a pre-existing common law, they are usurp-
ing the role of the legislature. Second, to the extent that judicial
rulemaking changes and “reforms” existing procedural case laws, it
is inherently a flawed, less “wise” process, that will inevitably have to
be revisited by courts in actual cases.
An excellent example is a leading Massachusetts case involving a
judicially promulgated rule, Mass. Rule of Professional Conduct
4.2.130 The Comment to the Rule, approved by the Court and
promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts at the
same time as the Rule, made it explicit that an adversary lawyer
must not contact a corporate official on the other side who is in a
position to legally bind the corporation without the approval of the
corporation’s lawyer. In a famous case involving the Corporation of
129. Ironically, Langdell was one of the first American law professors to actually assign
procedural rules as a text, using the New York Code of Procedure in 1875–76. But his intro-
ductory text, James B. Ames’s A Selection of Cases on Pleading at Common Law (1875), was en-
tirely case-oriented and contained no reported rules. Langdell also emphasized the
importance of procedural forms, evolved through case law. See Bruce A. Kimball & Pedro
Reyes, The “First Modern Civil Procedure Course” as Taught by C. C. Langdell, 1870–78, 47 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 257, 261, 267–69 (2005). See also the masterful study of Langdell and case
method in BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C. C.
LANGDELL, 1826–1906, at 130–65 (2009).
130. This, of course, is a court-promulgated rule of ethics, not of procedure, but the
point is the same. See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2011).
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Harvard University, Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. President &
Fellows of Harvard College,131 the Supreme Judicial Court held that
the Comment was erroneous and that only the “control group” of
Harvard University was covered.132 Such cases obviously undercut
the prospective advantages of judicial rulemaking for guidance to
the bar. But “taught law is tough law,”133 and the inherent superior-
ity of case law has been instilled, consciously or unconsciously, in
generations of Anglo-American lawyers and, with that, a distrust of
prospective rulemaking driven by progressive, inductive, Baconian
methods.
B. The Attack of the Legal Realists: Rule “Skepticism” from Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. to the Critical Legal Studies Movement—
Rulemaking as a Futile Exercise
Both Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Christopher Columbus
Langdell believed that radical reform was needed in American legal
education after the Civil War.134 Langdell’s answer was a case-based
approach that, like Coke, treated law as an “artificial science” with
rigorous central principles—an approach that spread like wildfire
throughout America’s law schools. Holmes, on the other hand, saw
law very differently.
Literally facing Langdell and his disciple James Barr Ames at the
Lowell Institute Lectures in November, 1880, Holmes challenged
the fundamental “gospel of Savigny,” that the common law was
fixed and immutable. In Holmes’s immortal words, later repeated
in his Common Law (1881):
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and politi-
cal theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or uncon-
scious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
131. 764 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 2002); see also DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, REAL ETHICS FOR REAL
LAWYERS 317–18 (2d ed. 2012).
132. There was an emphatic dissent. See Messing, 764 N.E.2d at 836–40 (Cordy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). According to Justice Cordy, “[i]n this context it is painful
to see the court now claim that, when it adopted the commentary, it did not intend its conse-
quence.” Id. at 838.
133. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW IN THE RENAISSANCE 18 (1901).
134. Holmes had strongly criticized Harvard Law School in an entry written with Arthur
C. Sedgwick in the American Law Review (October, 1870), which observed that the School was
“almost a disgrace to the Commonwealth . . . . We say ‘almost a disgrace’ because, undoubt-
edly, some of its courses & lectures have been good, and no law school of which this can be
said is hopelessly bad.” SUTHERLAND, supra note 134, at 140. R
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fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed.135
Holmes continued:
What has been said will explain the failure of all theories
which consider the law only from its formal side, whether they
attempt to deduce the corpus from a priori postulates, or fall
into the humbler error of supposing the science of the law to
reside in the elegantia juris, or logical cohesion of part with
part. The truth is that the law is always approaching, and never
reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles
from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from his-
tory at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or
sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it
ceases to grow.136
From these great lines evolved the famous “legal realist” school
of jurisprudence that dominated Columbia Law School in the
1930s, drove the great jurisprudence of Louis Brandeis and Jerome
Frank, and inspired the Critical Legal Studies Movement at Harvard
and Stanford in the 1980s.137
You might think that, since Holmes and the legal realists were
critical of legal formalism, they might be more hospitable than the
formalists to progressive rulemaking. But you would be wrong. To
grossly oversimplify, at the heart of legal realism was skepticism
about the “purity” or “neutrality” of any legal rule, if what was
meant was that the rule was free from political or economic bias.
Indeed, the very notion of a “level playing field” would appear to
legal realists as a worthy goal in the abstract, but wishful thinking in
practice. Rationalist, codified rules were a myth if one truly believed
that they could be applied in a predictable, scientific manner, par-
ticularly over time. In Holmes’s words,
[h]owever much we may codify the law into a series of seem-
ingly self-sufficient propositions, these propositions will be but
a phase in a continuous growth. To understand their scope
135. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1st ed. 1881); see also COQUIL-
LETTE, supra note 10, at 558. R
136. HOLMES, supra note 137, at 36. R
137. See generally the excellent accounts of Laura Kalman in LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL RE-
ALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM
13–22, 57–58, 82–84 (1996).
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fully, to know how they will be dealt with by judges trained in
the past which the law embodies, we must ourselves know
something of that past. The history of what the law has been is
necessary to the knowledge of what the law is.138
As Commager put it, “legal realism” was “a new way of thinking
about law and of applying it. It was a shift from absolutes to rela-
tives, from doctrines to practices, from passive—and therefore pes-
simistic—determinism to creative—and therefore optimistic—
freedom.”139 But a shift from “absolutes to relatives” and from
“doctrines to practices” again favors the evolutionary freedom of
case law, this time an intellectually honest case law, that acknowl-
edges that the judiciary is a vehicle for political, ideological, and
even economic change—the case law of a Lord Mansfield, a Justice
Brandeis, or a Warren Court. It is easy to see why both Holmes and
Brandeis opposed the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act, Brandeis
being “ ‘unreservedly against the measure.’ ”140 Its promise of neu-
tral, transparent, and prospective rules that could be relied on as
constants over time was intellectually suspect and, as a practical
matter, futile. Enacting and empirically testing such rules, if this
138. HOLMES, supra note 135, at 37. One of the more interesting exchanges between R
Holmes and Langdell and Langdell’s loyal disciple, James Barr Ames, occurs in the context
of essays they prepared on the history of equity and equity pleading. See 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (Ernst Freund, William E. Mikell & John H. Wigmore eds.,
1908) (published by the Association of American Law Schools) [hereinafter 2 SELECT ES-
SAYS]. Holmes had previously argued that the substantive law of equity did not necessarily
embody “superior ethical standards” compared with the common law. OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY (1885), reprinted in 2 SELECT ESSAYS, supra, at 707. Ames
blasted back, “The acceptance of these conclusions would be difficult for any one who has
studied his equity under the guidance of Professor Langdell.” JAMES BARR AMES, THE ORIGINS
OF USES AND TRUSTS (1908), reprinted in 2 SELECT ESSAYS, supra, at 738. Langdell’s contribu-
tion to the volume SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK ET AL., THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITY PLEADING
FROM CANON LAW PROCEDURE (1877), reprinted in 2 SELECT ESSAYS, supra, at 753, 775, empha-
sized the active judicial control of equity as an advantage over common law:
In one system, therefore, the court is active, assuming the supervision and control of
the proceedings in an action from beginning to end; in the other, it is passive, leaving
the respective attorneys to conduct their proceedings in their own way.
Id. at 775. This, of course, is consistent with Subrin’s thesis that the philosophy of modern
federal rulemaking evolved from the procedure of equity. Subrin, supra note 31, at 929–73. R
139. HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 378, 374–81 (1950).
140. Burbank, supra note 45, at 1083 n.296 (quoting Letter from Hon. Louis D. Brandeis R
to Hon. Thomas J. Walsh (May 14, 1926)); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 26–33, 135–36 (2000). For a full discussion, see Burbank, supra
note 45, at 1083 n.296; see also Subrin, supra note 31, at 958 n.284 (citing the responses to R
Senator Thomas W. Shelton’s 1926 letter to the federal judges seeking their views on a uni-
form federal rule approach) (“The responses from U.S. Supreme Court Justices were also
mixed (Sutherland and Stone clearly for the Enabling Act; Brandeis and Holmes clearly
against).”). See generally Burbank, supra note 45, at 1069–83.
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was the route chosen, should be a function of Congress, which was
openly political. Applying rules in practice, in cases and controver-
sies, was best done by judges, who could allow the rules to evolve in
“continuous growth.” On this, both the formalists and realists could
agree, although for different reasons.
While there are still “old-fashioned” formalists on today’s law
school faculties, the center of academic thought has shifted to the
heirs of Holmes, Brandeis, Frank, and the legal realists. Like
Holmes and Brandeis themselves, today’s legal realists, whether
they call themselves followers of “critical legal studies” or not, see
law reform as an inherently political process, whether done
through legislation or courts. No wonder the idea of non-partisan,
“objective” rules committees, whose prospective rulemaking is
based on empirical, “scientific” research, and whose goals are a
more just and efficient legal process for all federal litigants, is often
met with skepticism in American academia today.141
C. The Political “Whig” Attack: Thomas Babington Macaulay, “Civil
Prudence” and the Modern Populist—Rulemaking as
Dangerous to Democracy
Legal formalists and legal realists have both questioned the core
assumptions of Baconian rulemaking and the tradition of equity
from which it springs. But there is a third group whose opposition
to Bacon and his thought has been the most persistent, historically,
and the most vehement. Representatives from the great Whig politi-
cal traditions have not only opposed Baconianism; they have feared
it.142
Bacon made no attempt to hide his lack of faith in democracy, if
by that one meant a system that assumed an egalitarian society.
Long before the triumphs of modern technology, Bacon main-
tained that men were not created equal in their intelligence and
141. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 288 (2009) (outlining view that the rulemaking process is
ideologically skewed); Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemak-
ing Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 72–73, 99–100 (2010). There is a useful list of “rules critics” in
Arthur Miller’s Duke Conference Address. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 13 n.43 (2010). My
special thanks to Andrea L. Kuperman, Chief Counsel to the Rules Committees and true
colleague and friend, for her tireless assistance.
142. COQUILLETTE, supra note 10, at 313; see MATHEWS, supra note 3, at 337–68. R
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their understanding of the natural world.143 Further, Bacon had lit-
tle faith in individualism. Even highly talented individuals could be
so deceived by their personal “idols” that they could be highly dan-
gerous in the absence of a coercive, all-knowing government.144 In
the Novum Organum, Bacon called the individual human mind an
“enchanted glass” whose inherent flaws distorted the clear reflec-
tion of the truth like a bewitched mirror.145 Leveraged by the power
of modern technology, such individuals could be capable of great
destructive power—a very close prediction by Bacon of modern ter-
rorism. The solution, fully developed in Bacon’s deeply disturbing
utopia, the New Atlantis (1624), was to vest power in a strong,
central government, whose leaders were chosen based on elitist
principles of merit and intelligence and operated as a collective to
control individual deviation.146 Over time, public safety would in-
creasingly demand that the rest of society be closely governed—and
closely watched by an ever-present system of security and
surveillance.
Whig historians from the seventeenth century onward saw Ba-
con’s thought as absolutely dangerous to populist democracy. This
sentiment culminated in Thomas Babington Macaulay’s great at-
tack on Bacon in his “Lord Bacon,” reprinted in Critical and Histori-
cal Essays of 1866.147 Macaulay pulled no punches. Had Bacon kept
143. For an understanding of Bacon’s view of the social structure, see FRANCIS BACON,
NEW ATLANTIS (1624) (describing Bacon’s utopia called Bensalem); Spedding vol. III, supra
note 2, at 121 (preface to NEW ATLANTIS); see also COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 256–62 R
(discussing NEW ATLANTIS). Bacon’s fictional utopia was ruled by an elite secret order, the
“Order” or the “Society” or the “Fathers” of Salomon’s House, to which all state officers were
inherently subordinate. COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 258–59; accord Spedding vol. III, supra R
note 2, at 154–55. R
144. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 227–34; Spedding vol. IV, supra note 2, at 53–54. R
Bacon’s secretary, Thomas Hobbes, would later take this suspicion of individualism as against
the collective wisdom to its final classic expression in his LEVIATHAN (1651). COQUILLETTE,
supra note 1, at 237–43 (noting the likely influence of Bacon’s Aphorisms on political thinking R
of his secretary, Thomas Hobbes, who had custody of the Aphorisms); see also BERTRAND RUS-
SELL, HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 535–41 (1961) (describing Hobbes’s suspicion of in-
dividualism in LEVIATHAN).
145. In Bacon’s words, “ ‘For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal
glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is
rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and
reduced.’ ” COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 227 (quoting Spedding vol. III, supra note 2, at R
394–95).
146. Spedding vol. III, supra note 2, at 151–54; see COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 260–61 R
(footnote omitted) (“Bacon invented the expression ‘knowledge is power.’ In Bensalem,
knowledge was all-powerful. But there was also something deeply disquieting about Bensalem
and Salomon’s House. . . . [I]t was a society which, to a modern liberal, would be oppressive,
sexist, hegemonic, hierarchical, intolerant and, in the last analysis, based on a system of
secrets.”).
147. THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, LORD BACON, reprinted in THOMAS BABINGTON MACAU-
LAY, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS 341, 341–408 (1860).
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out of politics, and left his elitist tendencies as theory only, all
might have been better. But he did not. In Macaulay’s words,
[o]ur opinion of the moral character of this great man has
already been sufficiently explained. Had his life been passed in
literary retirement, he would, in all probability, have deserved
to be considered, not only as a great philosopher, but as a wor-
thy and good-natured member of society. But neither his prin-
ciples nor his spirit were such as could be trusted, when strong
temptations were to be resisted, and serious dangers to be
braved.148
In short, Bacon was politically dangerous. Macaulay argued fur-
ther, “If we admit the justice of Bacon’s answer, we admit it with
regret, similar to that which Dante felt when he heard the facts of
those illustrious heathens that were doomed to the first circle of
Hell.”149
And it was not just Bacon’s elitist tendencies or his commitment
to authoritarian politics that alarmed Macaulay and his Whig fol-
lowers. Bacon’s philosophy was not idealistic, at least when it came
to individualism. Bacon believed all individuals to be flawed, and
individual freedom was a low, if not dangerous, priority. Rather, his
goal was pragmatic, step-by-step progress. Again, as Macaulay put it,
“[t]wo words form the key of the Baconian doctrine, Utility and
Progress.”150 And “[t]o make men perfect was no part of Bacon’s
plan. His humble aim was to make imperfect men comfortable.”151
These were words of faint praise from an idealistic Whig. Macaulay
concluded:
We should not then have seen the same man at one time far in
the van, and at another time far in the rear of his generation.
We should not then be forced to own that he who first treated
legislation as a science was among the last Englishmen who
used the rack, that he who first summoned philosophers to the
great work of interpreting nature was among the last English-
men who sold justice.152
Today, we live in an America where elected judges are the over-
whelming norm in the states, and life-appointed federal judges
148. Id. at 388.
149. Id. at 391.
150. Id. at 389.
151. Id. at 397.
152. Id. at 414.
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have been a target of both parties in the recent presidential prima-
ries.153 The powerful discretion of a Lord Chancellor would be
regarded as anti-democratic, and Bacon’s record for corruption
would be seen as symptomatic of unelected and thus unaccountable
power. Bacon’s arguments that the elite should govern—the thesis
of his utopia, the New Atlantis—and that legal rules should be made
by elite experts, “scientific” and immune from the bias of demo-
cratic politics, can be as suspect in America today as in the England
of Coke and Macaulay.
So what does one “do” about these historical lines of attack on
progressive Baconian theories of law reform and rulemaking, par-
ticularly in light of the realities of modern American academia and
democratic politics? To begin, nothing about the Rules Enabling
Act or the Rules Committees will satisfy these critics. Langdellian
formalists, forged for a century in the “Socratic” classrooms of
America’s elite law schools, are not about to abandon their faith in
the intellectual and even moral superiority of case law—although
first-year curriculum reform at Harvard and other major law schools
is beginning to change the paradigm.154 Nor will the “legal realist”
descendants of Holmes and Brandeis lose their “rule skepticism.”
And perhaps most importantly, populist, democratic politics in to-
day’s America, left or right, whether styled “Tea Party” or “Social
Justice,” will never accept the inherent meritocracy of elite exper-
tise embodied in the philosophy of Congress’s historic delegation
of power in the Rules Enabling Act.155
153. See, e.g., GOP Candidates Would Cut Federal Judges’ Power, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gop-candidates-would-cut-federal-judges-power/
2011/10/23/gIQA5u4Z9L_story.html; Erwin Chemerinsky, GOP Candidates: Bashing Judges,
Threatening Democracy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011, at A21. As to the overwhelming role of
elected judges in most state courts, see Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary 12–13 (John M. Olin Law
& Econ., Working Paper No. 357, 2007). My special thanks to Charles Riordan, my most
invaluable editorial assistant, for his assistance on this point. While this theme was commonly
found in the Republican 2012 primaries, concern over the composition of the federal judici-
ary is found in both parties. See Neil A. Lewis, Deal Ends Impasse over Judicial Nominees, N.Y.
TIMES (May 19, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/19/us/deal-ends-impasse-over-
judicial-nominees.html?ref=charleswsrpickering; Jeffrey Toobin, Advice and Dissent, THE NEW
YORKER, May 26, 2003, at 42–48.
154. See generally Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60
VAND. L. REV. 597–608 (2007) (proposing major changes in the first–year curriculum toward
legislative and regulatory sources as opposed to case-law studies only—changes now actually
being implemented at Harvard Law School).
155. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, Title
IV, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4649 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (b) (2006)) (indicating Con-
gress’s special reservation of power with regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence owing to
congressional rejection of the original proposed Article V of these rules); Judith A. McMor-
row & Daniel R. Coquillette, Federal Law of Attorney Conduct (2010); see also Peter G.
McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655 1660–66 (1995).
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But wise rulemakers can mitigate these inherent, historic hostili-
ties. It is here where Edward Cooper becomes the true disciple of
the better side of Bacon’s legal philosophy. Let us start with
Langdellian legal formalism. Intelligent deference to the evolution
of case law, rather than rushing in with rule “fixes,” has marked
Cooper’s distinguished career both as scholar and Reporter. As
Rick Marcus’s article in this volume, Shoes That Did Not Drop, demon-
strates, Cooper’s achievements have been based at least as much in
wise deference as in reforming action.156 As for the “legal realism”
so influential in today’s law schools, and its inherent cynicism and
“rule skepticism” about any “objective” and “nonpartisan” lawmak-
ing, the answer has to be the same as Bacon’s (i.e., a relentless ef-
fort to develop good empirical research as free from political and
economic bias as possible and devoted to testing rules against social
benefits that are widely, if not universally, shared). Where rulemak-
ing can be thus demonstrated as effective in achieving the basic
goals of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and pro-
ceeding,” even “rule skepticism” can be mollified, if not
convinced.157
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, today’s rulemakers must
not repeat Bacon’s mistakes in defying democratic politics. Ulti-
mately, the Rules Committees were created by Congress and exist at
Congress’s discretion.158 How do we retain Congress’s confidence?
Congress’s 1988 “Sunshine” Amendments to the Rules Enabling
Act tell us how.159 Transparency of process, continued communica-
tion with the key Congressional committees and staffers, and, ulti-
mately, deference to strongly felt Congressional concerns, are
156. See Richard L. Marcus, Shoes That Did Not Drop, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637 (2012).
See also the Hon. Mark Kravitz’s thoughtful treatment of the same subject in To Revise, or Not
to Revise: That Is the Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 213 (2010). Judge Kravitz looks to the
wisdom of the past:
Professor Robert Cover wrote that Professor Moore “always envisioned the Federal
Rules as a tool which embodies a practical philosophy of procedure, one which liber-
ates the courts to achieve substantive ends.” I like to think that is what the Civil Rules
Committee continues to do to this day—to provide judges the procedures necessary to
“liberate” them to decide individual cases on their substantive merits with competence
and integrity.
Id. at 225 (footnote omitted).
157. See the discussion of the history and philosophy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1
in Daniel R. Coquillette, Scope and Purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Defined in Rule
I, in 1 DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE chap. 1, 1-1-1-56 (3d ed.
2008).
158. See sources cited supra note 155. R
159. The Advisory Committees are, by mandate of Congress, “sunshine” committees. See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, Title I, § 104(e), 108 Stat. 4110 (codified as
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required if the Rules Enabling Act is to survive another century.
That is not to say that the Rules Committees must not stick up for
what is best for the legal system—they owe an allegiance to the Arti-
cle III federal system as well. Nor should they fail to remind Con-
gress, in short-term controversies, of the long-term wisdom of
Congress itself in establishing the Rules Enabling Act. But absolute
transparency and cautious deference, the hallmark of Edward
Cooper’s career as Reporter, are an answer, indeed the only an-
swer, of federal rulemakers to the voices of populist democracy in
today’s America.
CONCLUSION
When Francis Bacon spoke of “reporters,” it was in the context of
his far-reaching and genuinely radical proposal to introduce profes-
sional and expert reporters to record the decisions of the courts—
something unheard of at the time.160 But in describing the desired
qualities of such reporters, Bacon used language that resonates
deeply with today’s Federal Rules Committees, institutions with
which he would have deeply identified. His vision of progressive
lawmaking, tested by empirical science, called for professionals of
exceptional intelligence and integrity—ironically, a standard he
only met in the first part. He called for “grave and sound lawyers,
with some honorable stipend, to be reporters,”161 persons of “great
learning” who would “carefully and faithfully receive the Rules and
Judicial Resolutions given in the King’s Courts”162 and who would
assist in “bearing up [the laws’] authority in the eyes of our people,
and give life and vigor to our said laws and the execution of
them.”163 Edward Cooper is exactly the kind of “reporter” Bacon
had in mind. Bacon said:
I hold every man a debtor to his profession, from the which as
men of course doe seeke to receive countenance and profit, so
ought they of duty to endevour themselves by ways of amends,
to be a help and ornament thereunto; this is performed in
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2006)); DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 801–27 (3d ed. 2001); McCabe, supra note 155, at 1656–68; MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, R
supra note 155. R
160. Francis Bacon, ORDINATIO QUA CONSTITUUNTUR LEZ REPORTERS A LEGE, reprinted in
Spedding vol. XIII supra note 2, at 264–66; COQUILLETTE, supra note 1, at 210, 214 n.54. R
161. Spedding vol. XIII, supra note 2, at 69 (“Propositions to His Majesty”). R
162. Id. at 86 (“A Memorial Touching the Review of Penal Laws and the Amendment of
the Common Law”).
163. Id. at 265 (“Ordinatio qua Constituuntur Lez Reporters de Lege”).
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some degree by the honest and liberal practice of a profes-
sion . . . but much more . . . if a man bee able to visite and
strengthen the roots and foundation of the science itself;
thereby not only gracing it in reputation and dignity, but also
amplifying it in perfection and substance.164
“An ornament” to his profession, who “visits and strengthens the
roots of the science itself,” thereby “gracing it in reputation” and
applying it “in perfection and substance”—a perfect description, by
Francis Bacon, of Edward Cooper.
164. FRANCIS BACON, A COLLECTION OF SOME PRINCIPAL RULES AND MAXIMS OF THE COM-
MON LAWES OF ENGLAND B2 (1639).
